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The Internet of Things (IoT) is rapidly growing, and 
offers many economical and societal potentials and 
benefits. Nevertheless, the IoT also introduces new 
threats to our Security, Privacy and Safety (SPS). The 
existing work on mitigating these SPS threats often 
fails to address the fundamental challenges behind the 
mitigation measures proposed, and fails to make the 
relations between different mitigation measures 
explicit. This paper, therefore, offers a conceptual 
framework for understanding and approaching the 
challenges and obstacles that arise in addressing the 
SPS threats of the IoT. This contribution aims to help 
policymakers in adopting policies and strategies that 
stimulate others to develop, deploy and use IoT 
devices, applications and services in secure, privacy-
friendly and safe ways. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The Internet of Things (IoT), a network of (smart) 
devices, sensors and other objects, is rapidly growing 
and increasingly affecting our society. The World 
Economic Forum predicts that the IoT will contain 20 
to 30 billion objects in 2020 [63], where objects can 
range from toothbrushes and lamps to buildings and 
roads. The IoT has all kinds of potentials and benefits. 
For instance, it can improve health by monitoring 
patients’ activity and food consumption patterns [30], 
increase productivity by increasing the efficiency of 
manufacturing processes [60], and support 
sustainability by saving energy through smart meters 
[27]. 
The IoT, however, also introduces threats to our 
Security, Privacy and Safety (SPS). Security threats 
entail cybercrimes such as breaking into, and taking 
over IoT devices, and stealing data. Privacy threats 
arise because (sensitive) data are used for purposes 
other than they were collected for. Safety threats come 
with system failures because of dysfunctional IoT 
devices. As the IoT expands, the consequences of these 
threats, which are mostly not specific to the IoT, will 
increase. The fast and ad-hoc growth of IoT products 
and services makes it difficult for system designers 
(concerning the technical aspects) and policymakers 
and legislators (concerning the non-technical aspects) 
to foresee and devise mechanisms that guarantee 
responsible use and development of IoT systems. Yet, 
if IoT threats are not addressed by adequate mitigation 
measures, the IoT can inflict major physical, mental 
and monetary damages [47]. 
The IoT consists of different components (software, 
hardware, infrastructure), is applied in many different 
domains (e.g., healthcare, logistics, agriculture), and 
involves multiple stakeholders (e.g., manufacturers, 
service providers and consumers). Therefore, in order 
to design an integrated set of mitigation measures for 
IoT SPS threats, an in-depth analysis of the threats and 
their possible countermeasures is needed. The literature 
offers several accounts that address the mitigation of 
IoT SPS threats, both from a technical and policy-
based perspective. Most of the works proposing 
mitigation measures, however, only provide a list of 
measures, but fail to address how these measures are 
related to each other and what the obstacles are in 
implementing them (e.g., [16][18][28]).  
In this paper, we offer a conceptual framework for 
understanding and approaching the technological and 
non-technological challenges and obstacles that arise in 
addressing SPS threats. The non-technological 
challenges and measures framed in this contribution 
are at a strategic, policymaking and governance level. 





 By this, the proposed framework aims at helping 
policymakers to adopt policies and strategies that 
stimulate others (e.g., service providers, manufacturers, 
and consumers) to develop, deploy and use IoT 
systems in secure, privacy-friendly and safe ways. 
Unlike other works, the conceptual framework 
presented in this paper models and captures the 
fundamental challenges that impede a successful 
deployment of the solutions proposed in the literature, 
and points out some solution directions to deal with 
these fundamental challenges. 
This paper is based on research [8] performed by 
the WODC (Dutch abbreviation for Wetenschappelijk 
Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, in English: 
Research and Documentation Centre) for the CSR 
(Dutch abbreviation for Cyber Security Raad, in 
English: Cyber Security Council). The WODC is the 
research center of the Dutch Ministry of Security and 
Justice, and the CSR is a national advisory body that 
provides solicited and unsolicited advice to Dutch 
policymakers and legislators on cyber security. 
Methods used to perform the research are: literature 
review, interviews and round-table discussions with 
experts and stakeholders in the Netherlands (for more 
detail, see [8]). The work focuses on the situation in 
the Netherlands, but we expect that many of the 
findings are applicable to other countries as well. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 
provides a more comprehensive discussion of IoT SPS 
threats, and (technical) solutions for addressing these 
issues. Section 3 discusses related work on policy 
measures to mitigate SPS threats. Section 4 introduces 
a conceptual framework including four obstacles that 
impede addressing SPS threats and solution directions 





This section discusses IoT SPS threats, and 
describes important measures that can be taken to 
design and deploy IoT systems in secure, privacy-
friendly and safe ways. Some of these measures have 
critical issues, but those will be discussed in Section 4. 
The aim of this section is to provide a general 
overview of threats and solutions, and is by no means 
an exhaustive list of either of these. 
Security threats are caused intentionally (in contrast 
to safety issues, which are caused unintentionally), and 
can be classified according to the so-called CIA triad: 
1) confidentiality, 2) integrity, and 3) availability [59]. 
First, confidentiality threats involve unauthorized 
access to data of IoT systems, possibly leading to the 
collection of sensitive data, blackmail or digital 
espionage. Second, integrity threats concern 
unauthorized adaptation of settings and/or data of IoT 
systems, e.g., altering the setting of a pacemaker to 
increase someone’s heartrate. Third, availability threats 
occur, for example, when a malicious person gains 
access to an IoT system by taking over the control of a 
self-driving car, demanding ransom to regain access to 
one’s system, or taking out IoT networks through a 
distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS attack; note 
that IoT objects can be used to carry out such attacks). 
IoT systems collect large amounts of (personal) 
data, increasing the risk of Privacy threats. These 
issues can arise, for instance, when personal data are 
used by insurance companies for price discrimination, 
or by the police to determine someone’s (risk) profile. 
The IoT can also be used by companies and authorities 
to continuously monitor people’s behavior, which can 
be experienced as a privacy violation, and lead to 
behavior change. In addition, data might be used for 
other purposes than they were collected for (a so-called 
function creep). Data anonymization does not 
necessarily provide a solution to the problems 
described above, as supposedly anonymous data can 
often be de-anonymized by combining different data 
sets [47]. 
Safety threats, as mentioned above, are non-
intentional [4]. Similar to security and privacy threats, 
safety threats originate from shortcomings in, e.g., the 
design, production, deployment, or maintenance of IoT 
objects. Other causes of safety issues include failing 
infrastructure or (unpredictable) emergent behavior due 
to the interaction between different IoT objects. 
Finally, IoT objects are not always adequately 
provided with software updates, which makes them 
more susceptible to security leaks over time.  
Above described SPS threats should be considered 
during the whole lifecycle of an IoT system (i.e., 
before, during and after deployment). Before 
deployment, SPS threats should be accounted for in the 
design of IoT systems. This is often referred to as 
security, privacy, and safety by design [38]. When used 
for collection and storage of (personal) data, IoT 
devices can be made SPS-friendly, for instance, by 
adding features such as a delete button or an opt-out 
option. During and after deployment, it should be made 
sure that IoT devices are transparent, accountable and 
regularly provided with software updates [23].  
During all stages of the product lifecycle, solutions 
should be used that are based on best practices, or if 
these are not available, on new or innovative practices 
that may turn into best practices. An example of such a 
practice is to deploy a layered defense strategy against 
SPS threats, ranging from user awareness to process 
procedures, so that SPS can still be guaranteed even if 
one of the layers fails [24]. Furthermore, the 
development and use of (international) standards and 
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 guidelines to cover known issues promote SPS-friendly 
IoT systems. This requires public-private and 
international collaborations. 
 
3. Related work 
 
There are many survey articles that discuss IoT or 
IoT-related issues, and possible measures against them 
(e.g., [16][15][18][20][28][44][53][64][65]). Some of 
these articles have a different or narrower focus than 
the current contribution. Related papers address, for 
example, the Internet [64], big data [65], privacy 
protection [18], or cyber security [44].  
Articles that specifically concern the IoT often have 
different aims. In 2015, the Dutch Ministry of 
Economic Affairs published a report that focuses on 
the technological trends and applications of the IoT 
[48]. In the same year, the European Parliament 
brought out a research report on the “opportunities and 
challenges” of the IoT [20][53], while the Internet 
Society published one on its “issues and challenges” 
[48]. The British Government Office for Science [28] 
and the Dutch CSC [16] both published a report 
proposing measures against IoT SPS threats. Although 
some of these papers review IoT issues and their 
solution directions based on some insightful 
taxonomies, they fail to account for the underlying 
obstacles, as we do in this contribution. 
Some papers bring up obstacles such as lack of 
governance, incentives, and knowledge and education 
(also see Section 4). For example, Danezis and 
colleagues [18] mention these issues in the context of 
privacy engineering techniques in the general setting of 
ICT systems. However, they do not provide a link 
between the aforementioned obstacles in a directive 
way indicating an approach to address those 




Based on our study, we developed a conceptual 
framework of addressing IoT threats. Figure 1 provides 
a schematic overview of the framework. The top of the 
figure (dark gray boxes) shows that IoT SPS threats 
(top left) require adopting and developing SPS 
mitigation measures (top right), as discussed in Section 
2. Below that, the figure shows four fundamental 
obstacles (middle dark gray boxes) in realizing and 
deploying these measures (IoT complexity, lack of 
awareness, lack of incentives, and lack of monitoring 
and enforcement), and the corresponding solution 
directions to address them (light gray boxes).  
The explicated relations among the obstacles in the 
figure are the ones that we considered most important, 
but they are not the only ones possible. For example, 
an increase in complexity may increase the other 
obstacles. Facing obstacles (like lack of incentives and 
monitoring) properly, often call for new information 
needs. Implementation of these needs causes, in turn, 
an increase of the technical complexity. The relations 
in the figure thus do not necessarily imply causality. 
The four obstacles and solution directions will be 
discussed in the following subsections. We view 
complexity as the main obstacle for taking effective 
SPS mitigation measures, involving multiple layers and 
reasons and, therefore, it is described in more detail 
than the other three obstacles. The first obstacle is 
technological of nature, and mainly requires solutions 
in the field of software and system engineering. The 
other three obstacles are procedural, and require 
policy-related solutions.  
 
4.1. IoT Complexity 
 
In this section we explain the reasons behind and 
the impact of IoT complexity (Subsection 4.1.1), and 
present a number of solution directions to deal with 
IoT complexity, particularly from the viewpoint of 
addressing its SPS threats (Subsection 4.1.2). 
 
4.1.1. Reasons and impacts. IoT complexity stems 
from a number of reasons. First, the basic architecture 
of IoT systems is generally divided into four layers: the 
perception layer (representing the interaction with the 
physical world), the network layer (embodying global 
communication among system components), the 
middleware layer (enabling management and 
processing of sensory data and actuation signals), and 
the application layer (representing the provisioning of 
IoT services to (end-) users) [3][15][27][38]. With that, 
IoT systems have two layers more than traditional ICT 
systems: the perception and middleware layers. This is 
the main cause of IoT complexity, as these layers 
comprise a large number of sensory, actuation and 
processing devices with heterogeneous software and 
hardware components from many (possibly small and 
unknown) manufacturers.  
Second, proliferation of IoT devices creates large 
amounts of data of various formats, types and 
granularities. These (big) data can be processed and 
linked to other data sets in order to deliver enriched 
information about people and their physical and virtual 
environments, often containing (new) personally 
identifiable data [31][48][65]. As such, the collection 
and use of IoT data may result in many privacy threats. 
Usually, IoT data pass through many organizational, 
judicial, national and system boundaries, and are 
combined with other data sets along the way. The data 
subjects, consequently, may not know how their data 
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework of the obstacles in addressing IoT SPS threats (boxes on left 
side), and solution directions to overcome them (boxes on the right side). 
 
are treated and cannot apply their data ownership rights 
appropriately. Data recipients and processors, on the 
other hand, cannot identify the data subjects and do not 
know their preferences about how to treat their data.  
Third, a wide range of stakeholders – e.g., citizens, 
scholars, entrepreneurs, and civil servants [11] – play a 
role in developing, deploying, and using IoT-based 
services. As these stakeholders are spread over various 
geographical, governmental, judicial and 
administrative boundaries, it becomes difficult to 
enforce or apply the rules, regulations, interests, and 
standards that apply within those boundaries. For 
example, those who misuse IoT data cannot easily be 
identified and held accountable for their deeds.  
IoT complexity makes it more challenging to 
realize efficient, scalable and interoperable SPS 
mechanisms for IoT than for traditional ITs [66]. We 
identified five reasons for that. First, malicious 
attackers in IoT have access to a vast number of attack 
vectors [49][66], pertaining to the perception and 
middleware layers. For example, the middleware layer 
introduces a new type of stakeholders acting as service 
enabling intermediaries. These parties may become a 
source of privacy and security threats by launching 
man-in-the-middle attacks or inferring privacy-
sensitive information from collected sensory data. 
Second, SPS mitigation mechanisms for traditional 
ICTs are often insufficient in IoT settings and therefore 
they should be improved before being applied to the 
IoT [38]. For example, due to the large volume and 
velocity of IoT data, it is ineffective to apply solutions 
such as informed consent (as users get overburdened if 
they are asked for consent every time that (new) data 
are collected), privacy policies (due to increased 
complexity of policies when they are specified for IoT 
data), and data provenance (due to increased overload 
and complexity in marking the origin of the IoT data, 
and the processes applied to them). Furthermore, 
DDoS attacks (the most common network attacks 
especially in IoT settings) cannot be mitigated 
effectively by using traditional intrusion detection and 
prevention mechanisms [33].  
Third, non-comprehensive mitigation mechanisms, 
i.e., those that aim at addressing SPS threats within a 
limited temporal, spatial or legal scope, may not work 
well in IoT settings because different layers of IoT are 
melt into one large system integration [33]. Interaction 
among such localized mechanisms, with limited 
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 scopes, may cause undesired emergent behaviors [42]. 
Thus “security technologies should provide the strong 
protection for all levels of system components at all 
stages” and system layers, [39, p. 13]. 
Fourth, similarly, at the governance level it is 
ineffective to have small-scale measures, such as 
unilateral sanctioning of stakeholders who do not adopt 
appropriate SPS measures, or defining narrow 
regulations and standardizations for IoT systems. Even 
when a (limited) number of countries impose sanctions 
on specific IoT products and services, the use and 
adoption of such products and services in other 
countries may still have adverse impact on the first 
group of countries. 
Fifth, due to complexity, more trade-offs arise 
between, for example, privacy and public security, 
privacy and utility, connectivity and disconnectivity. It 
is also difficult to seek one-size-fits-all solutions due to 
the contextual dependency of IoT systems in terms of 
when, where, how or why they are applied. These 
contextual conditions dictate the degree of risk 
involved and, therefore, SPS solution(s) should be 
adopted accordingly.  
In summary, dealing with IoT SPS threats is rather 
complex. Considering the inherent complexity of the 
IoT, system developers and companies may be 
reluctant to adopt SPS mitigation measures (e.g., using 
security and privacy by design principles). 
 
4.1.2. Solution directions. Realizing SPS by design in 
IoT systems requires designing an IoT infrastructure 
that is pervasive, interoperable and intelligent by 
thoroughly correlating the SPS-related design decisions 
with the requirements and characteristics of those IoT 
systems [34]. Creating this ubiquity, interoperability, 
and smartness is complex and should be realized at all 
system levels, such as architecture, protocols, and 
algorithms, as will be elaborated upon in the following. 
At the architectural level, solution directions such 
as 1) Service Oriented Architecture (SOA), 2) web 
service architecture, 3) intelligence distribution, 4) 
cloud computing, and 5) employing software 
development tools are proposed. Firstly, SOA 
decomposes “complex and monotonic systems” into 
well-defined simpler components, and offers common 
interfaces and standard communication protocols 
among these components [6]. In recent years, IoT 
middleware architectures are often based on the SOAs 
[6], offering, among others, a way to deal with 
complexity issues. Secondly, web service architectures, 
relying on open and royalty free IETF (Internet 
Engineering Task Force) standards and best practices, 
offer a flexible and interoperable system design that is 
proven for traditional web services. Using the web 
service architecture for IoT services – or “Web of 
Things” as considered in [6] – has been widely viewed 
as a promising way to realize flexible and interoperable 
IoT systems [67]. Thirdly, intelligence distribution is 
another way to cope with IoT complexity issues at the 
architectural level. This can be done in two directions. 
On the one hand, costly computations, processes and 
operations (like data exchange, decision-making and 
computation) can be shifted from low power and low 
computing capacity IoT devices to resourceful system 
components located in access and core networks like 
gateways [38] and proxies [6]. On the other hand, some 
processing tasks and functions can be shifted from 
central components to those at the edge network to 
yield improved functionalities like system availability, 
fault tolerance, data sharing and management, trust 
management, and governance [49]. This so-called edge 
intelligence principle can be created by “connected 
intranets of things” located in (spatial) areas like 
hospitals, stations and households [49]. Fourthly, cloud 
computing is a promising approach for distributing 
intelligence towards a core network. Moreover, the 
cloud can realize some IoT middleware functions like 
device interconnection, data processing, and data 
storage. Here the cloud offers sensing as a service, as 
mentioned in [66] and the references therein. Lastly, 
having a set of common toolkits for application 
developers can make it easier for them to design and 
reprogram IoT devices after deployment [14]. 
At the protocol level, proposed solution directions 
are 1) designing lightweight IoT protocols, 2) 
supporting existing SPS protocols, and 3) mapping 
new and existing protocols. Communication protocols 
for IoT systems should have lower complexity 
compared to those devised for traditional IT systems 
due to the power and networking limitations of IoT 
devices. Designing lightweight IoT protocols, for 
example, for key management, access authentication, 
and access control, is considered a continuous future 
research direction [33]. Additionally, in designing 
lightweight IoT protocols one should support existing 
security protocols (like IPsec) [49]. In order to have 
both new lightweight and old protocols, it is necessary 
to map them to each other. This entails mapping 
existing standards for internet communications with 
low-complexity counterparts designed for IoT 
communication over constrained networks. To this 
end, a reference protocol architecture is proposed in 
[67] to carry out protocol mapping at three layers of 
data, application/transport, and network. The proposed 
architecture maps three typical de-facto protocols 
XML, HTTP, and IPv4 to their IoT counterparts: EXI 
(Efficient XML Interchange), CoAP (Constrained 
Application Protocol), and 6LoWPAN, respectively.  
At the algorithmic level, there are solution 
directions proposed such as 1) devising lightweight 
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 cryptographic mechanisms, 2) adding self-
organizational capabilities, and 3) designing adaptive 
and context-aware IoT middleware. Security and 
privacy solutions often rely on cryptographic methods, 
which typically demand a high amount of 
communication, processing and/or energy capacity. In 
IoT settings, where these resources are scarce, new 
solutions are required “to provide a satisfactory level 
of security regardless of the scarcity of resources” (like 
lightweight symmetric key cryptographic schemes) [6, 
p. 16]. For instance, decentralized architectures with 
loosely coupled “smart objects” (i.e., autonomous 
objects that can sense, process and network) also show 
potentials for coping with IoT complexity [36]. In [50], 
three types of smart objects are identified, namely: 
activity-aware (able to record information about 
activities), policy-aware (able to interpret activities 
based on some predefined policies), and process-aware 
(able to interpret a collection of related activities in 
time and space). When smart objects are equipped with 
artificial intelligence capabilities, the corresponding 
IoT systems can portray self-protection, self-healing, 
self-optimization, self-management and self-
configuration characteristics [41][57][66]. In addition, 
such self-organization capabilities can also be 
employed in the middleware layer components [34] to 
deliver context-aware IoT middleware [66] that copes 
with the complexity of connecting billions of IoT 
devices. In [6], semantic-oriented IoT visions are 
considered as promising for describing, modeling and 
reasoning about IoT data. Using well-defined 
languages to describe IoT data with adequate metadata 
(i.e., in standardized formats, models, and semantic 
content descriptions) will enable IoT systems to 
support automated reasoning which, in turn, leads to 
the successful adoption of such IoT systems [41].  
Besides implementing technical solutions, adopting 
a collaborative approach is important for having an 
effective and sustainable impact on the security of the 
IoT ecosystem [35]. To this end, collaboration and 
cooperation among IoT stakeholders can take place on 
various levels such as smart object [34], policy, 
legislation, standardization, and governance 
[12][14][49]. Additionally, one should coherently and 
cost-effectively validate and test the interoperability 
and compatibility of different IoT devices [57].  
 
4.2. Lack of knowledge 
 
Dealing with the complexity of the IoT is impeded 
by a lack of awareness and knowledge among users, 
IoT producers and providers, and policy-makers (see 
Figure 1). In order to successfully deal with the SPS 
threats of the IoT, awareness of the existence of these 
issues is needed in the first place. Subsequently, 
knowledge of mitigation measures is needed to protect 
oneself against cyber threats [52]. 
 
4.2.1. Reasons and impacts. The human factor forms 
a crucial element in the defense against cyber security. 
When information systems become better protected by 
technological solutions, attackers shift their attention to 
human elements to break into these systems [2]. For 
instance, users often use standard passwords [8] or 
reuse passwords for multiple services [19], increasing 
the risk that attackers gain access to sensitive 
information. Another malicious strategy for tapping 
into human vulnerability is the use of phishing emails, 
which entice users to click on links leading to websites 
with malicious software [22]. Both examples show that 
human behavior can play an important role in 
mitigating cyber security risks and that users are 
currently not protecting themselves as much as they 
could. This can be explained by a lack of knowledge 
and awareness among users. When people are well 
informed, on the other hand, they are better capable of 
defending themselves against cyber threats [37][53]. 
Besides users, it is also important that IoT 
producers and providers, and policymakers have 
knowledge and awareness concerning SPS threats. 
With the right knowledge, producers and providers can 
develop safe, secure and privacy-friendly IoT systems 
[38], and policy-makers can take the measures needed 
to support the development of these systems [51]. 
Currently, however, this knowledge is not always 
present. A report on IT projects initiated by the Dutch 
government, for example, concludes that there is an 
“almost unbridgeable gap” between IT experts and 
policymakers [45]. Another report concludes that 
policymakers have insufficient awareness and 
knowledge of IoT threats [8].  
There is an interplay between IoT complexity on 
the one hand, and lack of knowledge and awareness on 
the other hand. The fast developments and the high 
complexity of IoT systems require a continuous update 
of knowledge in order to stay well informed. As this is 
difficult, the fast developments and high complexity 
create a lack of knowledge and awareness. At the same 
time, because hardly anyone has an overview of the 
latest developments in the whole IoT field, this 
knowledge gap impedes dealing with the complexity of 
the IoT. 
 
4.2.2. Solution directions. There are a couple of 
measures that can be taken to overcome the knowledge 
gap. First, investments in education can help to 
increase knowledge and awareness concerning the IoT 
[12][44]. These investments could target primary and 
secondary education, and universities, which educate 
future generations of IoT users and developers. 
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 Research should yield insight into the best teaching 
practices. The UK, for instance, considers to base 
mathematical education in schools on computational 
thinking, with a focus on problem solving rather than 
making calculations [28], but others advocate other 
approaches [12]. Investments should also be made in 
the (re-)education of employees that currently work 
with, provide or develop IoT systems.  
Second, awareness campaigns about cyber security 
can increase digital resilience of citizens [20]. Such 
campaigns should be accompanied by easily accessible 
and clear information to citizens, e.g., in the form of a 
website or an online crash course. Campaigns can also 
be used to start or foster public debate between 
citizens, companies and researches, on the trade-offs 
between security and other values. 
Last, investments in (scientific) research can help 
creating SPS solutions, taking into account that most 
users do not have expert knowledge [49]. Many of the 
approaches for addressing IoT threats discussed in 
Section 2 and the current section originated from or 
were inspired by scientific research. 
 
4.3. Lack of incentives 
 
As discussed in Subsection 4.1, the complexity of 
the IoT makes it expensive and difficult to devise and 
apply appropriate measures against SPS threats. On top 
of that, taking such measures often yields little benefits 
for the respective party. For example, once a user has 
paid for a certain product, the company has little 
incentive to keep on investing in security updates for 
that product. Additionally, regarding the demand for 
increased knowledge and awareness, as discussed in 
Subsection 4.2, different parties do not always 
immediately experience the benefits of more 
knowledge and awareness themselves. In other words, 
dealing with IoT complexity and the lack of awareness 
and knowledge is impeded by a lack of appropriate 
incentives and motivations (see Figure 1). 
 
4.3.1. Reasons and impacts. The lack of incentives to 
create or use SPS friendly IoT devices applies to both 
users and companies. Users often do not experience 
harm when their IoT devices are hacked, and in many 
cases, they do not even notice that this happened. For 
instance, a smart thermostat does not necessarily loose 
its functionality when it becomes part of a botnet. 
Moreover, when settings are hidden in a complex 
menu, it can be a hassle to adopt SPS measures. Thus, 
users often do not feel the need to adjust their behavior 
when using IoT devices, or to improve their knowledge 
about IoT use, in a way that promotes safety, security 
and privacy.  
For companies, there are different reasons for the 
lack of incentives. First, it is attractive for companies 
to be the first to launch a new product, and the 
development and implementation of security measures 
takes time [62]. Second, once a product is sold, there is 
little incentive for companies to provide updates that 
ensure security [32]. Developing security updates costs 
time and money [44], and can even hinder the 
functionality, compatibility and ease of use of the 
product [7]. For startups, which introduce many new 
IoT products, there are even fewer incentives than for 
bigger companies since they have little reputation to 
loose [29]. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) could play 
an important role in mitigating security risks, but also 
for them, the extra costs yield little benefits [5][7]. 
 
4.3.2. Solution directions. The lack of incentives to 
cope with complexity (by adopting suitable SPS 
mitigation measures), and to increase knowledge 
applies to both users and companies. For users, 
however, it is reasonable to assume that companies sell 
sound products. Therefore, measures to generate 
incentives should mainly target companies. We will 
discuss several of these measures in the following.  
First, a measure to generate incentives for 
companies is to strengthen the so-called duty of care. 
Duty of care refers to someone’s duty to take into 
account and act in accordance with the interests of 
others [56], which can also involve companies’ duty to 
provide secure and privacy-friendly IoT systems. 
Current duty of care regulations are not always suitable 
to apply to IoT products or services. For instance, it is 
unclear what companies’ responsibilities are regarding 
the updating of unsafe software on IoT devices. 
Current Dutch case law shows that this is judged on a 
case-by-case basis [56][62]. 
Second, accountability based on damage caused by 
IoT systems can be an important incentive for 
companies to offer safe and secure products [43]. 
Moreover, solid accountability regulations can provide 
the basis for duty of care. Though companies are 
currently already accountable for the products they 
sell, accountability is often evaded. It is often difficult 
(due to IoT complexity) to pinpoint the source of the 
problem in malfunctioning software, and thus to 
identify who is responsible for that problem. Moreover, 
accountability is sometimes circumvented by excluding 
it in a product’s terms and conditions [26]. 
Third, since various parties are involved in the 
production of IoT systems, the introduction of supply 
chain responsibility can help making IoT systems more 
secure [10]. This means that all parties involved in the 
supply chain share the responsibility for the end quality 
of a product. Parties in a chain can impose rules and 
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 make demands to each other and, if necessary, hold 
each other accountable for possible damage [12]. 
Fourth, cyber risk insurances can create incentives 
for companies, provided that the insurers require 
companies to comply with certain security standards 
[40]. As the risks of cyber-attacks are growing and the 
potential damage of such attacks increases, it becomes 
attractive for companies to insure themselves against 
such risks. Insurance companies often make use of 
security standards to estimate the risk of an attack, and 
thus the height of the premium a company has to pay. 
This provides an incentive for companies to comply 
with higher security standards. 
Finally, policymakers can offer incentives to ISPs 
to mitigate security risks [5]. As ISPs act as a doorway 
to the Internet for many, they are in an advantageous 
position to mitigate cyber security risks. Providing 
policy-based incentives lowers the costs for ISPs to 
take mitigating measures, and it increases the pressure 
for them to act. In the Netherlands, for example, 
several ISPs collaborate in the Dutch anti-botnet center 
AbuseHub [25], which is partially financed by the 
Dutch government. 
 
4.4. Lack of monitoring and enforcement 
 
Increasing and creating incentives requires devising 
and applying appropriate mechanisms such as 
monitoring and enforcement. Lack of monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms impedes the effects of the 
incentives described above, as indicated in Figure 1. 
 
4.4.1. Reasons and impacts. Current regulations on 
privacy and security in IT are limitedly monitored and 
enforced. An example of this is the data breach 
notification obligation introduced in the Netherlands as 
of January 2016. This obligates companies to report 
data leaks and take measures against them. If no 
measures are taken, the Dutch data protection authority 
can impose fines up to a maximum of €820,000 or 10% 
of a company’s year revenue. In the first year, 5,500 
data leaks were reported. Some warnings were given, 
but no fines were imposed so far. It is estimated that 
18,500 data leaks were unreported [46].  
In addition, standards only work with effective 
monitoring and enforcement. Conformité Européenne 
(CE) marking offers an example of this mechanism. 
CE is a mandatory marking for certain products sold 
within the European Economic Area. The marking 
represents the manufacturer’s declaration that the 
product meets European requirements on security, 
health, environment, etc. Each year, however, several 
CE-marked unsafe or unsecure products are withdrawn 
from the market, due to insufficient capacity for 
monitoring and enforcement [1]. Though CE marking 
is not specifically aimed at cyber security or privacy, 
the above example demonstrates that a standard alone 
does not guarantee the safety or security of a product.  
The current duties of care and accountability 
regulations are not specific for IoT systems, which can 
create uncertainties about their scope. As discussed in 
Subsection 4.3, it is unclear what companies’ 
responsibilities are regarding updating unsecure 
software on IoT devices [56][62]. Because of these 
ambiguities in duty of care and accountability 
regulations, it is harder to effectively monitor and 
enforce them.  
 
4.4.2. Solution directions. Adequate monitoring and 
enforcement are important conditions for incentives 
such as duty of care and accountability. It is also 
important for effectuating standards. An obvious 
measure to overcome a lack of monitoring and 
enforcement is thus to invest in increased capacity at 
involved supervision authorities.  
Another measure is to improve current duties of 
care and accountability regulations. As mentioned 
earlier, these regulations are sometimes unclear when 
applied to IoT systems. To be effective, duty of care 
should become more concrete on what an end-user can 
expect from a provider, which may require additional 
research. In addition, both duties of care and 
accountability regulations should be clear on the 
timespan during which they are applicable. This 
timespan may vary for different IoT products. A 
thermostat, for instance, is seldom replaced, whereas 




This paper introduced a conceptual framework for 
addressing IoT SPS threats, as shown in Figure 1. The 
framework proposes the deployment of SPS by design 
to minimize SPS threats, and identifies four obstacles 
in realizing this: 1) IoT complexity, 2) lack of 
awareness, 3) lack of incentives, and 4) lack of 
monitoring and enforcement. The framework also 
shows how these obstacles, and solution directions to 
overcome them, are related to each other in that 
addressing one impacts the other one(s) and vice versa. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this work is 
that there is no one-size-fits-all measure to address SPS 
threats. Instead, a variety of measures is needed to 
create an SPS-friendly IoT. 
We have a number of suggestions for future work. 
First, the research presented in this paper was 
performed in a Dutch context. Additional research 
could focus on other countries. Second, the research 
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 presented in this paper is rather general. Further 
research could focus on addressing SPS threats in 
specific application domains. Third, research is needed 
to investigate the feasibility and effects of different 
measures. Fourth, a closer study of the technical 
aspects of IoT systems could enhance SPS-by-design 
practices. Finally, future research could investigate the 
legal implications of adopting legislations concerning 
the IoT. 
The above recommendations for future work can be 
used to improve and specify the conceptual framework 
proposed in this paper, thus contributing to the aim of 
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